Does Xi dream of communist sheep?

In the Orwellian world of 'Xi Jinping Thought,' the new Great Helmsman and the Party are one; can the Party ever replace him?

image; Midjourney

BY VIRTUE of its subject matter, any book about the thought of Xi Jinping is bound to have its slow moments – and this one doesn’t disappoint. It’s possible to excerpt a passage at random (see below) and feel sympathy – at a remove, because this is not even “original gangster” Xi – for any Chinese for whom such bedtime reading is a way of getting ahead:

The doctrine of “comprehensively governing the Party strictly” has two crucial reinforcing elements. It is about instilling in party members the ethos of Xi Thought and strengthening the institutional capacity to require party members everywhere to act in accordance with the top party leadership. Together they seek to make the Party and its top or “core” leader work in sync so that the vision and policies of the leader are implemented effectively and efficiently.

• Publisher ‏ : ‎ Oxford University Press (December, 2023)

• ISBN‏: ‎ 0197689361

Despite no shortage of such grit-the-teeth passages, what The Political Thought of Xi Jinping by Steve Tsang and Olivia Cheung has going for it is that it’s not Kevin Rudd’s 600-plus page tome, On Xi Jinping: How Xi's Marxist Nationalism is Shaping China and the World, which has been described as “encyclopedic” on Xi’s thinking and revealing on the subject of the evolution of Rudd’s own thinking.

Rudd, in short, sees Xi as a “Marxist nationalist” and not necessarily averse to war sometime in the future. What’s more, Rudd’s thinking has evolved such that he no longer thinks the West should gift China with “strategic trust.” On the contrary, China’s best presented with “strategic confusion” lest the superpower think twice about sparking WWIII by making good on irredentist territorial claims.

In The Political Thought of Xi Jinping we’re on much less personal ground. There’s no personal journey and Xi is far less a Marxist than a man with an autocratic mission to make a mark on the annals of Chinese and world history. Academic at times, the book nevertheless provides interested readers with what it purports to: a glimpse into just what Xi, with all those books on governance, is thinking – or otherwise.

It’s tempting, after all, to take a skeptical view of a leader’s thoughts when he thinks nothing of spending more than 3-1/2 hours, as he did at the opening of the 19th Party Congress in 2017, sermonizing the long version of “The Chinese dream is a dream about history, the present and the future.”

There’s a strong argument to be made – and The Political Thought of Xi Jinping makes it – that Xi Thought, or more officially, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” is less Marxist ideology than a straight line through Leninism, Stalinism and Maoism to Xi-ism,. The latter is where revolutionary idealism gives way to Party discipline, centralized control and manipulating a Leninist framework to exert and maintain power via the leadership of Xi.

In 2017, we knew Xi saw himself as an agent of change and was ambitious, but we did not fully appreciate how ambitious he truly was. What was clear then was that Xi Thought must be taken seriously, as Xi made it unmistakable that he intended to make himself the helmsman of China’s ship of state, along the line of the Maoist tradition of Mao being “the great helmsman.”

Tsang and Cheung argue that Xi appears to see himself as destined to rescue the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from factionalism and corruption. His mission is to restore the Party’s all-powerful control over the state, which he sees as having been separated as a result of former leader Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic political reforms.

He’s also found a way – which Mao, who found China’s “feudal” past repugnant, could not – to embrace China’s “splendid” history – all “5,000 years” of it. In Tsang and Cheung’s reading it’s impossible not to be struck by what must in Xi’s view be his staggering contribution – the ever-ringing refrain of “Chinese characteristics” – in redeeming China’s past: no more humiliation, no more shame, a rejuvenated China manifested as the Chinese dream.

This is a book about Xi Thought, so does Xi actually believe that he himself is key to bringing about the great rejuvenation of the Chinese state and bringing the Chinese dream into being? The authors say he does:

Xi has attracted a legion of critics, including a handful of regime defectors, decrying him for crowning or clowning himself China’s new emperor. Yet, besides his self-interest and concerns for regime security, all signs suggest that Xi genuinely believes that his strong personalist rule and a reinvigorated Leninist party provide the winning formula to achieve the China Dream.

Elsewhere they write:

… with the formalization of Xi Thought, Xi and the Party have converged into one entity, so much so that Xi’s self-interest and the Party’s interest are no longer distinguishable. Since Xi epitomizes the regime, he is the only party member whose “personal intentions” automatically equal the Party’s “organizational intentions.”

The genius, then, if that is what it is, of Xi Jinping Thought is precisely this: it appears to be a sophisticated political doctrine, but it's actually a highly personalized vehicle for Xi's autocratic ambitions. The doctrine doesn't serve the nation or even the Party – it serves Xi. The reason is likely as simple as the fact that Xi’s ambitions are historical – messianic even – in nature.

In parallel to Mao Thought’s being hailed as the only correct path to save China, Xi Thought is presented as the only true path for national rejuvenation. Mao Thought and Xi Thought are also the only ideological contributions of Chinese leaders incorporated into the party and state constitutions as “thoughts” while their titular progenitors hold office. While Xi has not yet so proclaimed, there is little doubt that he aspires for his Thought to be on par with Mao Thought.

The problem with Xi Thought – as was the case with Mao thought – is its recursiveness. Every proclamation, every theoretical construct ultimately resolves back to Xi as the central, indispensable figure. The “thought” is designed so that loyalty to the Party becomes indistinguishable from loyalty to Xi personally.

As the writers put it “belief in socialism means belief in Xi Thought. To “love socialism” is to require the people to embrace Xi Thought.” And thus to love socialism is to love Xi.

It’s almost as if Orwell saw Xi coming in those grim years following the close of WWII.

“He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother.”

Xi Thought is less a political philosophy and more a cult of personality meticulously constructed to centralize power around Xi himself. When Xi is gone, and no longer able to keep his enemies at bay, the Party will have to reconstruct itself without him.

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Chris